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Strict Liability in the European
Union-Not a United States Analog
Andrew C. Spacone*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty-five years ago, the California Supreme Court in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Product, Inc.1 opened the floodgates of
strict liability and in doing so dramatically altered the landscape of
products law in the United States. Although some balance has re-
turned to this area of tort law since Greenman and its progeny,2
* Andrew C. Spacone is Assistant General Counsel, Litigation for Textron
Inc. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Spacone, and not neces-
sarily those of Textron. Mr. Spacone also wishes to acknowledge the research
assistance provided by Ms. Claudia Fischer.
1. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
2. Perhaps the most important illustration of the restoration of some balance
is the controversial Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1997) [here-
inafter Restatement (Third) Torts]. In § 2(b), the American Law Institute adopted
a definition for design defect, which moves away from the "consumer expectation"
test set forth in the previous Restatement, towards a test which centers on the
feasibility of an alternate design. Such a test is much closer to a negligence con-
cept than to traditional strict liability. See also General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101, (1994) [hereinafter GARAI (This Act imposes an 18-
year federal statute of repose for General Aviation products). Although character-
ized as a "jobs bill," GARA is tort reform. See Remarks of Edward W. Stimpson,
President General Aviation Manufacturers Association Before American Bar Asso-
ciation Section of Litigation, 2-3 (June 28, 1996), for a discussion of the legislative
history and basis upon which GARA was presented to Congress by the General
Aviation Industry. See also Robert F. Hedrick, A Close and Critical Analysis of the
New General Aviation Revitalization Act, 62 J. Air L. & Comm., 387 (1996). There
are other examples of favorable developments from the defendants' perspective,
such as stricter requirements for the admission of expert testimony under Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and its progeny, and greater ac-
ceptance of the doctrine of forum non-conveniens, which is a frequent issue in de-
fending product cases. See, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051 (West
1997) (recognizing the doctrine of forum non-conveniens). Texas is a particular
hotbed of general aviation litigation, especially for non-United States' plaintiffs
involved in accidents outside the United States. For a recent decision where a
Texas appellate court applied the doctrine of forum non-convienens in favor of a
helicopter manufacturer sued in this type of situation, see Baker v. Bell Helicopter
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manufacturers are still subject to stringent liability requirements
and potentially high judgments. In effect, many of the social, cul-
tural and institutional forces, which caused the introduction of
strict liability and shaped its application here, largely remain
intact.3
After a lengthy and intense debate, in 1985, the European
Community, now known as the European Union, adopted its ver-
sion of strict liability with the enactment of the Directive on Liabil-
ity for Defective Products (Directive),4 which imposed the doctrine
as an alternative to the member states' existing theories of recov-
ery. Strict liability under the Directive mirrors, in principle, its
United States' counterpart. It is not surprising, therefore, to find
that the supporters of strict liability in the European Union re-
flected the thinking of the doctrine's proponents here. From the
product producer's perspective, strict liability was viewed as a
means to significantly ease the burden of recovery for consumers
injured by defective products. In this respect, strict liability was
"fairer" than negligence and other more restrictive theories of re-
lief.5 The notion that manufacturers were in a better position than
consumers to spread the costs associated with product losses
through such mechanisms as insurance and pricing (so-called "cost
or risk spreading") was also widely offered as a justification for
strict liability.6 Additionally, advocates of the doctrine viewed it as
a deterrent to the production of unsafe products, although there is
some debate as to how much weight this rationale actually carried
Textron, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). While defendants have not
been uniformly successful in invoking this doctrine to ward off product lawsuits
involving foreign accidents, their chances of success are now much greater as the
doctrine has gained widespread acceptance. See generally Gary B. Born & David
Westin, International Civil Litigation in the United States Courts 289-366 (1996)
(discussing the doctrine's evolution and present state).
3. For a discussion of this subject, see Andrew C. Spacone, The Emergence of
Strict Liability: A Historical Perspective and Other Considerations Including Sen-
ate 100, 8 J. Prod. Liab. 1-40 (1985).
4. See Council Directive 85/374 EEC of 25 July 1985 (On the Approximation
of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States
Concerning Liability for Defective Products) 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter
Directive].
5. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive (1976) [hereinafter Pro-
posal]. This premise is incorporated as the second "whereas" clause of the pream-
ble to the Directive. See Directive, supra note 4, at preamble.
6. See Proposal, supra note 5, at 1.
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in the final analysis. 7 To anyone who has closely studied the emer-
gence of strict liability law in the United States, such thinking is
very familiar. The advocates of strict liability in the European
Union were aware of Chief Justice Traynor's seminal decision in
Greenman and his earlier concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co. of Fresno8 and transferred his rationale wholesale to the
debate over strict liability in the European Union. This thinking,
at least the fairness and cost-spreading rationale, played a major
role in the doctrine which emerged under the Directive.9
It is important to understand despite the foregoing that the
advocates for the American model of strict liability did not domi-
nate the debate over the Directive. Those who shared the perspec-
tive of the manufacturing and insurance industries also were given
considerable deference. Their primary concern appears to have
been that the adoption of strict liability in the European Union
would have led to the "excesses" (e.g., high judgments) of products
law in the United States, which would have resulted in an adverse
economic impact on the European Union. Specifically, concern was
expressed that high costs of products liability would translate into
higher product costs and prices, which then would make products
in the European Union less competitive and even lead to loss of
jobs. 10
7. The preamble Directive does not mention this objective. See M.C. Griffiths
et al., Developments in English Product Liability Law: A Comparison with the
American System, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 353 (1980) [hereinafter Griffiths]. Several of the
working documents I have reviewed, leading up to the Directive, also do not dis-
cuss this subject in any detailed way. This is not to suggest that the deterrence
rationale was not important. It certainly is on the mind of the Commission of Eu-
ropean Communities today. See Commission of the European Communities, Green
Paper: Liability for Defective Products 2, 9 & 14 (1999) [hereinafter Green Paper].
It appears, however, to have been of somewhat lesser importance than the "fair-
ness" and cost-distribution rationales. See generally Griffiths, supra note 7, at 371
(citing to Directive).
8. 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). The deterrence
rationale was particularly prominent in Chief Justice Traynor's opinion. It seems
to have acquired lesser importance in Greenman.
9. See Proposal, supra note 5, at 1.
10. This concern continues to this day. See, e.g., Green Paper, supra note 7, at
6. The Commission noted that it will take into account, in determining whether
any changes need be made to the Directive, the interests of "those products in
avoiding distortions of competition resulting from diverging rules on liability, and
reducing the impact of those differences on innovation, competitiveness and job
creation." Id. at 10, 16-17 (discussing the impact on the industry and insurance
sector).
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As will be discussed more fully below, the Directive repre-
sented a compromise between the interests of consumers and busi-
ness made within the larger context of what was good for the
European Union as a whole. Thus, although the doctrine which
emerged under the Directive embodied aspects of Chief Justice
Traynor's version of strict liability, it is far from a mirror image of
strict liability in the United States. Some of the important affirm-
ative defenses provided under Article 6 of the Directive, for exam-
ple, are generally not available here as absolute defenses.
Moreover, as will be discussed more fully below, there are other
significant differences in the structure of the Directive itself which
limit plaintiffs' ability to recover. This was certainly not lost on
contemporary observers of the Directive." Nevertheless, there
was still reason to believe that the Directive would result in mean-
ingful change for those injured by defective products, including fre-
quent use of strict liability, as well as increased product litigation
in general.
General aviation 12 products litigation, which this author is
most familiar with, in the European Union provides a good test of
this assumption. The injuries arising from the underlying acci-
dents are generally significant, often involving more than one per-
son, and product manufacturers are generally large corporations
likely to be well-insured. Such litigation also offers the in ter-
roreum aspects and potential for significant damage awards associ-
ated with any aircraft disaster. Further, it generally involves
complex technical issues, which provide manufacturers with an ad-
vantage, particularly in a negligence context (i.e., need to prove
fault) because they have better access to the critical information
necessary to successfully litigate, than consumers. Although the
Commission of European Communities, the proponent of the Direc-
tive, did not focus specifically on general aviation products litiga-
tion, this is the type of litigation which it concluded presented the
greatest hurdle to plaintiffs under prevailing negligence regimes. 13
11. For a contemporary account, see Griffiths, supra note 7, at 375.
12. At the risk of oversimplification, the term "general aviation" applies to all
aircraft other than public commercial (i.e., airlines) conveyances. By definition,
the term includes rotary, as well as fixed wing aircraft.
13. See, e.g., Eur. Parl. Doc. (351/76) 2 (1976-1977) [hereinafter Working
Documents].
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The current state of general aviation litigation in the Euro-
pean Union, however, seems to indicate that little has changed
from the plaintiffs perspective. The number of lawsuits against
general aviation product defendants, at least those with which this
author is most familiar, 14 does not appear to have increased appre-
ciably, if at all, since the passage of the Directive. Indeed, today
the United States remains as the forum of choice for high-stakes
products litigation involving Europeans injured in the European
Union by aviation products made by manufacturers based in the
United States. This is so, despite the fact that the barriers to suc-
cessful product litigation in the United States, particularly, gen-
eral aviation claims involving accidents outside the United States,
recently have become more formidable.15 In fact, there has been a
dramatic reduction in general aviation products litigation in the
United States in the last five years because of these barriers. 16 De-
spite this situation, if a significant general aviation lawsuit involv-
ing Europeans is not filed in the United States, it either may not be
brought at all or it may be brought only after a United States' court
has dismissed the action.' 7
Further indication of the Directive's lack of impact in this area
is that the European insurance industry, at least as of 1997, has
not significantly increased its premium rates for aviation products
coverage in the European Union.' 8 This certainly may be attribu-
table, in part, to competitive pressures in the European insurance
market. This author's experience is that pricing for products cov-
erage has been relatively stable worldwide in recent years. More
telling, in a recent survey of French, German and United Kingdom
aviation manufacturers, the consensus was that the Directive had
14. Exact statistics are difficult to obtain. General aviation manufacturers
are loathe to disclose them for obvious reasons. In addition, there is no central
repository of data in the United States, let alone in Europe. This author relies on
the experience of Textron Inc., one of the largest manufacturers of general aviation
aircraft and parts in the world, to support this conclusion. See infra note 16 and
accompanying text for further evidence that this is the case.
15. See generally supra note 2 and text cited therein.
16. For example, Bell Helicopter and the Cessna Aircraft Company, leading
general aviation manufactures, have witnessed a dramatic decrease in litigation
because of GARA. (Confidential information contained in files with author).
17. For a discussion of the doctrine of forum non-convienens, see supra note 2.
Under this doctrine, a frequent factor in dismissals is that the plaintiff is not time
barred from commencing litigation in the relevant non-United States forum.
18. See Jean-Michel Fobe, Aviation Product Liability Law in Europe-An Up-
date, Aviation Q. 159, 164 (1996-1997) (hereinafter Fobe 11.
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no impact on them.19 Whether this is the case for other product
lines is less certain, although all indications are that there has
been little increase in filings under the Directive, or even increased
resort to strict liability as a cause of action.20 Even in the United
Kingdom, where one gets the sense that more claims are being
brought than in other parts of the European Union, this may have
more to do with an increased awareness of consumer rights and
other developments, such as recent changes to the civil justice sys-
tem, as opposed to the Directive itself. Unfortunately, there does
not appear to be any reliable data to determine for certain what
the impact of the Directive is across the European Union. How-
ever, this may soon change.21
This is not to suggest that the Directive itself is a poor piece of
legislation. Many think otherwise, 22 and with ample justification.
It appears, however, that the Directive has had much less of an
impact than its more measured advocates, or even the Commission
itself, may have envisioned. The question then becomes, why? The
practical explanation for this appears to involve two primary ar-
eas: the limiting provisions in the Directive itself and, more impor-
tantly, the legal (and cultural) systems of the member countries.
The fact is that the procedural and substantive hurdles to success-
ful products litigation in the European Union are considerably
higher than in the United States. Equally important, the relevant
damages schemes of the member countries, which apply the Direc-
tive generally, are not nearly as generous as in the United States,
thus removing a powerful incentive for litigation. This disparity
reflects the more generous public welfare systems for health care
and wage continuation in the European Union. Simply put, in
practice, and, to a certain extent, in theory, strict liability in the
European Union is very different than its common law counterpart
in the United States.
19. See id.
20. See Sarah L. Croft & B6atrice Harichaux de Tourdonnet, The European
Product Liability Directive in Practice, For the Defense 13 (Feb. 2000).
21. As part of its study under the Green Paper, the Commission has commit-
ted to a survey to determine whether litigation has increased since the Directive
was enacted. See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 9, 17. The Commission expects its
report will be presented at the end of 2000.
22. See Croft & de Tourdonnet, supra note 20, at 10. Admittedly, these au-
thors are operating from the defense perspective. Having said this, a search of the
literature does not reveal a great deal of negativism aimed at the Directive, at
least not in the United States.
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The purpose of this article is to explore why strict liability in
the European Union has taken a different direction from its coun-
terpart in the United States and what the future holds for the doc-
trine. I do not intend to pass judgment on whether strict liability
in the European Union is good or bad from the injured party's per-
spective. My experience with the debate over federal tort reform in
the United States over the last fifteen years, for example, is that
ultimately it ends up being framed in this manner. In other words,
the interests of the consumer dominate the debate, for better or
worse. It is tempting, therefore, to criticize the Directive for not
protecting injured victims to the extent strict liability does in the
United States. Viewing the development of strict liability in the
European Union from such a typically American perspective, how-
ever, ignores the complex and unique interplay of cultural, social
and institutional forces which shaped the Directive and its applica-
tion. It is my intention to place the development of strict liability
in the European Union in its proper context, and in the process,
explore the uniqueness of the European experience. Part II will
discuss the major similarities between strict liability under the Di-
rective and its United States counterpart. As suggested, the Euro-
pean Union's version of strict liability is similar in principle to
strict liability in the United States. This similarity largely ends at
the theoretical level, however, and even there fundamental differ-
ences exist. Part III, therefore, will address the important doctri-
nal differences and explore the important European social and
cultural forces and institutions which account for these differences.
Part IV will close with a discussion of current developments in the
European Union, in general, and in the United Kingdom, in partic-
ular, which point to the potential for some change in the future.
General aviation products litigation will be used as a frame of ref-
erence for the discussion as a whole.
II. STRICT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. The Products Liability Directive-The Theory
Prior to the Directive's adoption in 1985, products law per se
was largely undeveloped in the European Union. This is not to
suggest that injured parties were without any recourse. Well-de-
veloped negligence law, for example, throughout most of the mem-
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ber countries, provided a basis for recovery, 23 albeit short of the
advantages offered by strict liability. In France, there was even a
system for liability without fault to deal with products which ap-
proximated strict liability.24 Also, prior to the enactment of the
Directive, several of the member states shifted the burden of proof
on liability from plaintiffs to defendants in negligence actions in an
effort to ease plaintiffs recovery in product cases.25 Further, in the
late 1960s, there was intense debate, in Germany, for example,
over whether strict liability should be adopted. In the final analy-
sis, the Bundesgerichtshof, the highest court for civil and penal
matters, concluded that it was a matter for the legislature to re-
solve.26 It is also apparent that in the years leading up to the Di-
rective, Europe was paying close attention to the developments
surrounding strict liability in the United States. For example, as
far back as 1970, the Council of Europe began to study the feasibil-
ity of strict liability. 27 Moreover, as will be discussed more fully
below, social forces were laying a foundation for some form of the
doctrine. In short, strict liability did not emerge suddenly with the
Directive's passage in 1985. It is fair to say, however, that prior to
the Directive, the doctrine was still considered revolutionary, and
clearly within the province of the legislature, as opposed to the
courts, to address.
Primary responsibility for the drafting and proposal of the leg-
islation rested with the Commission, which ultimately presented
the Directive to the European Council for enactment.28 The debate
23. See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 7, at 354-62 (discussing the state of negli-
gence law in the United Kingdom prior to the Directive). See also Christopher J.S.
Hodges, Product Liability: European Laws and Practice 5 (1993) (detailing specif-
ics regarding the Directive as it pertains to individual member states).
24. See Croft & de Tourdonnet, supra note 20, at 10-11.
25. See Jean-Michel Fobe, Aviation Products Liability and Insurance in the
European Union 39 (1994) [hereinafter Fobe III.
26. See generally BGHZ 51, 91 (The Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen con-
cluded that the concept of strict liability was not compatible with the principles of
tort law as laid down by the German legislature. Thus, it was for the legislature to
decide whether a producer should be subject to a strict liability standard.).
27. Griffiths, supra note 7, at 362.
28. See generally Croft & de Tourdonnet, supra note 20, at 11 (describing the
roles of the European Institutions). The role of the Commission is to make propos-
als for legislation and oversee common policy implementation. It is the only body
that can make legislative proposals. In addition to the Commission, at least four
other institutions have a role to play in the enactment of legislation and its inter-
pretation in the European Union. They are the European Parliament, the Council
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over strict liability was lengthy and intense by any measure. Some
have gone so far as to categorize it as "fierce."29 Indeed, the first
draft of the proposed Directive was presented by the Commission
in 1976, nine years before it was passed. While the Directive itself
contained many new and bold aspects, the most intense debate ap-
pears to have largely centered around three specific areas: the idea
of a strict liability regime itself; the so-called "developmental risks"
(i.e., state of the art); and, the upper limits on damages. 30
The Directive would undergo several iterations before it was
finally enacted. Certainly, part of the delay in passage was attribu-
table to the relative newness of the European Union legislative
process and the several entities which were involved with the Di-
rective's passage. It has taken the European Union some time to
sort out its legislative process. Indeed, although the concept of a
common market had been around for several years, in 1985 the
idea of what a united Europe meant was still evolving in the minds
of most Europeans. It was one thing for the member states to
tinker with the burden of proof in negligence actions to ease plain-
tiffs' road to recovery. It was another thing altogether for the Eu-
ropean Union to impose a uniform strict liability regime. There is
no gainsaying, however, that the controversial nature of the sub-
ject, particularly the three aspects mentioned above, played an im-
portant, if not critical role in the length of passage.
From a legal perspective, the Commission focused on negli-
gence, with its central concept of "fault," as the prevailing theory of
recovery, which provided undue impediments to plaintiffs' ability
to recover for product harm.31 The Commission recognized, for ex-
ample, that in complex technical cases the plaintiffs were at a dis-
advantage in proving fault under negligence, particularly because
of limits on discovery in most of the member countries which pre-
vented access to manufacturers' production processes and
records. 32 The pressure for strict liability arose, in large part, from
the mass injuries caused by thalidomide 33 in the 1960's, which
weighed heavily on the minds of Europeans for several years, and
of Ministers, the European Council and the European Court of Justice. The latter
is essentially the court of last resort for matters of community law.
29. Fobe II, supra note 25, at 35.
30. Griffiths, supra note 7, at 363-64.
31. See id. at 372; Directive, supra note 4, at preamble.
32. See Griffiths, supra note 7, at 372.
33. See id. at 362.
350 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:341
related occurrences. In this sense, the European and United
States experiences were similar. One of the major driving forces
behind the emergence of strict liability in the United States was
the increased injuries associated with the introduction of mass-
produced products and, thus, the need to open up for plaintiffs lim-
iting tort and contract (warranty) theories of recovery, as well as
the rise of consumerism in general. 34 The concern occasioned by
mass torts, as well as a general increased sensitivity to personal
rights and a growing pressure across Europe, in the 1970s and
1980s, in favor of some form of strict liability, provided the impetus
for the Directive. Unlike the United States, however, where strict
liability emerged from the common law courts, the doctrine re-
sulted from legislation in the European Union. As previously
stated, the legislative history surrounding the Directive reveals
that the needs of product manufacturers and the insurance indus-
try carried considerably more weight than in the United States.
Thus, unlike the United States' experience, strict liability under
the Directive was the result of legislative compromise, which
would have important consequences for injured parties seeking re-
covery for product harm.
The Directive was adopted by the European Union on July 25,
1985 with an implementation date of essentially three years later.
It is important to note that the Commission regarded the Directive
as only an "initial step" in harmonizing products law throughout
the European Union.35 As such, the Directive provides for five-
year review periods, which are intended to assess progress towards
achieving the Commission's objectives and the need for change.
Today, all of the fifteen member states have implemented the Di-
rective, with France being the last to do so in 1998. It is important
to note that the Directive supplements, but does not replace, the
various member states' liability schemes. Thus, plaintiffs may
bring causes of action for strict liability and negligence, for exam-
ple, although the Commission ultimately hoped that strict liability
would eventually be the predominate basis for relief, consistent
with the principle of harmonization.3 6
34. See Spacone, supra note 3, at 27.
35. Green Paper, supra note 7, at 11; Directive, supra note 4, at preamble.
36. See Working Documents, supra note 13, at art. 11 (20) ("[since, however,
the right bond on the directive gives the injured person a better legal position
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Significantly, the Directive makes no provision which allows
the member states to enact stricter rules under the Directive. The
member states are, thus, theoretically not free to alter the doctrine
of strict liability itself, although, in practice, this occasionally may
be difficult to enforce.3 7 Equally important, the Directive makes
no changes to the member states' procedural rules which govern
tort litigation. This is interesting because the Directive does not
deal with conflict of law issues, which runs counter to its stated
mandate of harmonizing products law throughout Europe. In fair-
ness to the Commission, it is cognizant of this limitation.38 Also,
the Directive leaves the amount of "material" damages (e.g., medi-
cal expenses, lost wages and "compensatory damages") which are
recoverable to the individual member states, although it does pro-
vide for an optional upper limit on these damages.39 The Directive
does not, however, address so-called "non-material" damages such
as pain and suffering, leaving plaintiffs to rely on whether the rele-
vant member states allow recovery for these damages. Pure eco-
nomic loss (e.g., lost profits other than those arising out of personal
injury or property damage) is not recoverable 40 and the damage to
the product itself, which is particularly germane to general avia-
tion litigation where there is generally severe, if not total damage
to the aircraft itself, is excluded. 41
The basic rule of the Directive is that product producers are
liable for damages caused by a defect in their products. The term
"producer" is fairly broad and includes importers and "suppliers"
(e.g., distributors), although the latter may avoid liability if they
can identify "within a reasonable period of time" to the consumer
who the actual producer is. 42 Significantly, Article 5 of the Direc-
tive adopts the concept of joint and several liability, which applies
to "all operations in the production chain," consistent with the
under the laws of all member states, it will in due course replace de facto other
rights which may perhaps exist").
37. See infra p. 367 and note cited therein. See also Croft & de Tourdonnet,
supra note 20, at 13 (discussing the dispute between the European Union and
United Kingdom over the "developmental risks" defense).
38. See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 11. See also Directive, supra note 4, at
art. 21 (requiring five year reviews).
39. See Directive, supra note 4, at art. 16.
40. See id. at art. 9(a) & (b).
41. See generally id. at art. 9 (setting forth the definition of "damage" for the
purpose of article 1).
42. Id. at art. 3(3).
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Commission's goal of achieving fairness for product users. Contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors is left to the laws of the individual
member states. What constitutes a product ("movables") is more
limited than the definition which has evolved here. This is basi-
cally irrelevant for purposes of this discussion because it encom-
passes all manner of aircraft including component parts, although
the latter may avoid liability by proving that the part complied
with the design specifications of the manufacturer of the product.43
The all important term "defect," includes within its ambit, manu-
facturing, design and failure to warn allegations, as in the United
States. Strict liability under the Directive also relieves plaintiffs
from the requirement of having to prove negligence ("fault") or for-
seeability. 44 Finally, similar to the United States model, the plain-
tiff need only prove "the damage, the defect and the causal
connection between the defect and the damage in order to re-
cover."45 Plaintiffs must, however, identify with specificity the
product which caused the harm. Of greater importance, the plain-
tiff has the burden of proof on liability and damages, which is in-
teresting because this marked a departure from the practice in
several member states under negligence. Finally, the Directive
does not provide for so-called "market share" theories of liability,
which are available in some jurisdictions in the United States.
Again, this was a somewhat curious development in light of the
fact that much of the impetus for the Directive came from mass
harm caused by pharmaceutical products which often present diffi-
cult manufacturer-identification problems.
The critical aspect of strict liability under the Directive, as it is
here, is the definition of defect. The Commission opted for a test
which is similar to the "consumer expectation" test adopted by the
minority of courts here and set out in § 402 A, Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. The Directive provides:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety
which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circum-
stances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
43. See id. at art. 7(f).
44. See id. at art. 4. One should examine the preamble to the Directive in
conjunction with the test for the defective included in art. 6.
45. Id.
2000] STRICT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 353
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that
the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.46
The Directive goes on to state that a product "will not be consid-
ered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subse-
quently put into circulation."47 The important word in this
definition is safety. As will be discussed below, it has important
implications for how "defect" is ultimately determined by the court.
Moreover, under the Directive, a product that does not provide the
safety which a person is entitled to expect, "taking all circum-
stances into account," is defective. As will be seen, this aspect of
the definition would appear limitless, and, thus, allow for an ex-
pansive application of the test. Before discussing the test for deter-
mining whether a product is "defective," it is helpful to briefly
discuss the change which the Directive brought to products liabil-
ity. In an article which appeared in the Tulane Law Review in
1988, two British commentators analyzed the impact of strict lia-
bility compared to the negligence ("reasonable duty of care") stan-
dard in English Law.48 They make it clear that the Directive
significantly eased plaintiffs' burden of recovery. For example,
they point out that under the English law of negligence, even man-
ufacturing defect cases (which present the least problematic issue
in products cases governed by strict liability) were often difficult
for plaintiffs to win.49 In this regard, the preamble to the Directive
specifically states, as a justification for strict liability, that the
plaintiff "normally has no access to the manufacturing process"
and, therefore, faces a significant obstacle to recovery. 50 This point
is particularly relevant in the European Union, because with the
exception of the United Kingdom until recently, discovery is much
more limited than in the United States. Concerning design and
warning cases, the authors concluded that "in English law before
the implementation of the Directive, liability for design and fail-
ures to warn, determined on ordinary principles of negligence,
have caused no particular problems" for defendants.51 Under the
46. Id. at art. 6.
47. Id.
48. See Griffiths, supra note 7, at 377.
49. See id. at 377.
50. Directive, supra note 4, at preamble.
51. Griffiths, supra note 7, at 377.
354 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:341
Directive, however, product manufacturers would face a more vig-
orous challenge.
In sum, strict liability under the Directive would provide in-
jured victims with an easier road to recovery than was available
under negligence theories in the United Kingdom and most of the
other member states.
B. The Consumer Expectation Test Versus the Risk-Utility Test
There has been considerable debate in the United States as to
exactly what the "consumer expectation" test is, let alone whether
it is a test at all,5 2 which probably explains why many of the states
courts opted for a more objective measure, the so-called "risk-util-
ity test"53 or some variation of it (e.g., "unreasonably danger-
ous").54 Under this later test, the plaintiff must prove that the
danger of the product is outweighed by the cost of avoiding the
danger, taking several "neutral" criteria into consideration. 55 Crit-
ical to this analysis is often the need for the plaintiff to prove that
an alternate, "feasible" design was available. Much of this criti-
cism of the consumer expectation test centers on the uncertainty of
the test's limited parameters, which is magnified by the premise
that juries are prone to engage in subjective decision-making. 56 In
effect, the argument (one that I and others have made) is that the
jury has virtually unlimited discretion to decide whether a product
is defective. If you accept the premise that juries can be unpredict-
able and arbitrary, it is understandable why product defendants
would prefer the more objective risk-utility test to the consumer
expectation test, although ultimately one wonders whether it
52. For a general discussion of this subject, see Restatement (Third) Torts,
supra note 2, at 77-79 and cases cited therein. For a favorable treatment of the
consumer inspection test, see Heafy & Kennedy, Product Liability Winning Strate-
gies and Techniques § 2.06(1) (1999) and cases cited therein. For an analysis of the
practical problems with applying the test within the context of the European
Union, see Marianne Corr, Problems with the EC Approach to Harmonization of
Product Liability Law, 22 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 235, 238-39 (1990). This analysis
forms the basis for my discussion at infra p. 356.
53. See Restatement (Third) Torts, supra note 2, at 77.
54. See id. at 77 for a discussion of the various tests for defect across the
states.
55. Id.
56. See id. For a contemporary discussion, see Griffiths, supra note 7, at 379-
80 and cases cited therein. In fairness to the authors, they appear to conclude that
the test under the Directive is an objective one.
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makes any difference in the United States what test juries are
presented with.5 7
The Directive and its legislative history provide little insight
as to exactly what the test means, other than that the Commission
certainly believed that it was objective.58 In fairness to the Com-
mission, the Directive did change the central focus of the inquiry
under negligence, i.e., the conduct of the parties, to the condition of
the product and whether it was defective. In this sense, it is cer-
tainly arguable that strict liability is more objective than the negli-
gence standard. Moreover, as pointed out by one scholar:
The wording of Article 6 is strictly objective and impartial as
between producer and consumer... [Tihe test should be that
of a neutral, independent person and this is consistent with
... [Article 61, which refers to the... level] of safety which
the public at large is entitled to expect. Certainly, defective-
ness is not to be judged by the expectation of the particular
person who has suffered the damage. Courts are familiar
with this distinction between subjective and objective tests.59
The Commission itself noted in an early study that "[tihe measure
of safety must be judged according to objective criteria on the basis
of circumstances in each individual case" and that it was the re-
sponsibility of the courts to apply it in an objective manner.60
It is apparent, therefore, that the Commission considered the
test to be objective because it focused on safety (as opposed to the
57. See Spacone, supra note 3, at 39-40. One of the central premises of this
article is that regardless of whether the test for defect is one of reasonableness or
strict liability, juries in the United States (and perhaps judges in the European
Union) are going to find liability under either test if that is the result they wish to
achieve. In other words, either test is sufficiently "flexible" to allow for liability, if
the trier of fact is disposed towards such a finding. Having said this, there is some
reason to believe that juries are not as "arbitrary and unpredictable" as some
might believe. See generally Harvey Berkman, Want Big Bucks? Try With a Jury,
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 27, 1999, at Al-All (Although the statistics Berkman cites do not
specifically cover products litigation, they do point to some interesting trends, par-
ticularly in verdicts, which cast some doubt on the proposition that defendants are
without hope in tort lawsuits.).
58. The Commission certainly believes it is an objective test today. See Green
Paper, supra note 7, at 6. Interestingly, the Commission seems to be saying that
the elimination of fault in favor of the condition of the product (i.e. expected level of
safety) ipso facto makes the test objective. See also Working Documents, supra
note 13 (discussing the proposed article 4 of the Directive).
59. Hodges, supra note 23, at 52 (emphasis added).
60. Working Documents, supra note 13, at 13 (discussing article 4 of the pro-
posed Directive).
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conduct of the manufacturer), taking numerous factors into ac-
count and intending that the courts would ensure that it was ap-
plied objectively. The courts, therefore, appear to have leeway to
consider many of the factors involved in the risk-utility test. For
example, the cost and feasibility of an alternate design may be very
relevant to determining what the expected level of safety should
be. In this sense, the test takes on aspects of the risk-utility test.
Having said this, applying the test still raises several practical
problems within the context of the European Union. This becomes
particularly critical when one considers that there are currently
fifteen member states in the European Union. Thus, there are po-
tentially fifteen different "definitions" of what level of safety is ex-
pected or, perhaps more accurately, what the judge determines is
the level of safety the consumer is entitled to expect.
The following example, while oversimplified, illustrates the
practical difficulties in applying the test. Assume a German court
is faced with a suit involving a French-made business jet with pas-
sengers from three different countries. The Directive provides no
guidance as to whether the relevant liability factors (e.g., regula-
tions and relevant consumer for purposes of determining the ex-
pected level of safety) are those of the place where the aircraft was
manufactured, those of Germany, where the accident occurred, or
those of the countries where the passengers resided. Moreover, the
Directive provides no insight as to what standard of proof for defect
is required, leaving this decision, 'apparently, to the individual
member states. When one starts adding variables such as compo-
nent parts (made in another country) and the various aviation reg-
ulations and related matters that are present in the typical general
aviation case, the situation becomes even more unclear. In fair-
ness to the drafters, however, it can certainly be argued that even
a risk-utility or cost-benefit test presents similar challenges be-
cause it too entails several considerations, albeit ostensibly more
"neutral" ones.
In many ways, whether the test for defect under the Directive
is objective or subjective is academic. What is apparent, however,
is that the definition allows for expansive interpretation, if the var-
ious courts of the member states, including the European Court of
Justice, which basically functions as the court of last resort for dis-
putes under the Directive, are inclined to do so. Unfortunately, the
case law under the Directive is too sparse to draw any firm conclu-
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sions as to how the definition will be applied, let alone how the
other aspects of the Directive work. There appears to be no case
law involving any major issue relative to general aviation prod-
ucts. What case law does exist generally involves less "exotic"
products and centers on issues other than the definition of defect.
For example, a recent decision in Belgium 61 was favorable to the
defendant on the so-called "developmental risks" defense, which
will be discussed below. The Belgian decision also is instructive on
the issue of proving defect because the court seems to have adopted
res ipsa loquitur as a means for proving defect.62 In a more recent
decision, the French Cour de Cassation, albeit in the context of a
blood transfusion scandal, gave effect to the Directive by ex-
panding the universe of plaintiffs to include the families of the vic-
tims, for "non-material" (i.e., pain and suffering) damages. 63 There
is at least one decision by the Court of Justice, however, which is
potentially adverse to plaintiffs on the developmental risk
defense.64
It is premature to draw any hard conclusions from these and
other decisions. There is a sense, however, which is shared by
some defense counsel in Europe, with whom I have spoken, that
judges in the European Union are increasingly willing to accommo-
61. See Riboux v. S.A. Schweppes Belgium, 21.11.96 Civ. Namur, 5e ch (1996);
Green Paper, supra note 7, at 23 n.44. But see, BGH 9.5.95, VI VR 158 and NJW
1995, 2162, for a contrary decision.
62. See id. For a discussion of this decision, see Green Paper, supra note 7, at
21.
63. Cass. Civ. I, 1998. For a discussion of this decision, see Green Paper,
supra note 7, at 19.
64. See Commission v. United Kingdom, 1997 E.C.R. 481. Here, the European
Court of Justice sustained the United Kingdom's definition of "developmental
risks" derived from the UK's Consumer Protection Act of 1987. What is interesting
about the decision is that the definition incorporated a subjective element-the
"ideal" producer-as the standard of measuring whether or not a defect could have
been discovered according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge,
thereby arguably allowing judges in the UK to apply negligence standards. In ef-
fect, the Court appeared to conclude that it was up to the courts of the member
states to interpret the defense, and in the case before it, the Court focused on the
fact that the Commission failed to present a decision from a UK court on the de-
fense which was counter to its intent and purpose under the Directive. It would be
a stretch, therefore, to conclude that the Court approved of the defense per se. See
also Marieke van Hooijdonk, Liability for Defective Products: Product Liability
Law and Product Safety Law, 4 Sept. 8, 1999 (discussing the 1997 decision of the
European Court of Justice) (on file with author); Croft & de Tourdonnet, supra
note 20, at 13.
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date plaintiffs in products cases. As previously discussed, the
shifting of the burden of proof in negligence cases would seem to
bear this out. More important, one also gets the sense from case
law prior to the Directive that some jurists are wary of aircraft in
general, and possibly inclined to rule against aviation defendants
on technical issues because of a basic misunderstanding, some
would say distrust, of how aircraft work.65 Whether all this will
add up to more plaintiffs' verdicts in products cases across the
board, let alone in general aviation cases, remains to be seen.
In sum, the definition of defect under the Directive allows for
an expansive application of strict liability. There is some indica-
tion that judges in the European Union would be willing to accom-
modate this, particularly for general aviation incidents. Moreover,
it is apparent that the drafters of the legislation intended that the
plaintiffs' burden to recovery would be eased; thus, there would be
more successful products litigation. The reality, however, would
seem to be otherwise. With minor exception, as suggested, there
has been little evidence that strict liability in the European Union
has had any real impact on products law, at least in terms of in-
creased claims, or even increased resort, to the theory as a basis of
recovery, as it relates to general aviation products. It would not be
much of a stretch to conclude that this situation is the same for all
product lines.66
65. For more information, see materials provided, during a private presenta-
tion to the insurance community, by a member of a London insurance company (on
file with author).
66. See Croft & de Tourdonnet, supra note 20, at 13:
In fact, there have been very few claims based solely on the Act [Di-
rective]; most products cases are pleaded in the alternative with negli-
gence... [cilaims made in contract and in tort are still far more common,
although the total number of civil litigation claims in the United Kingdom
is far, far less than in the United States; of these, only a small percentage
are product liability claims.
In 1995, a survey was conducted in the United Kingdom by the National Consumer
Council, which further confirmed the dearth of cases. Possible reasons cited by the
Council were the relative newness of the Directive, lack of awareness by consum-
ers and even lawyers, the problems associated with the developmental risks de-
fense and the under-reporting of claims, among others. See van Hooijdonk, supra
note 64, at § 2.4.
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III. THE PRODUCT LIABILITY DIRECTIVE-THE REALITY AND WHY
To understand the Directive's limited impact on plaintiffs' re-
covery, we must examine the Directive itself, and more impor-
tantly, the legal systems of the member states in which it is
applied. Necessarily, such a discussion can not ignore the major
cultural and social forces at work in Europe. The relatively small
number of lawsuits under the Directive, and, hence, paucity of ju-
dicial interpretation of strict liability, may partly be attributed to
the fact that the Directive is relatively new. As previously stated,
implementation of the Directive was not required until 1988 and
several of the member states missed this deadline by more than a
few years. Thus, there is merit to the argument that strict liability
in the European Union is still a new concept of which the public is
largely unaware. The Commission itself seems to have reached
this same conclusion. In 1995, it conducted the second five-year
review of the Directive, but failed to recommend any changes,
largely because the data (e.g., case law) was "very limited."67 Also,
at least in the general aviation context, it appears that the number
of accidents in Europe is significantly lower than in the United
States. This probably is attributed to the fact, although statistics
are difficult to find, that there are significantly fewer general avia-
tion aircraft in the European Union. Also, because damage to the
aircraft itself is not recoverable under strict liability, plaintiffs
must rely on negligence theories, which present more onerous bur-
dens to recovery. Further, because of their relatively high cost to
buy, as well as operate aircraft (fuel is much more expensive in the
European Union than in the United States), more of the aircraft
are operated by businesses, as opposed to private parties; thus, air-
craft are better maintained and operated, resulting in fewer acci-
dents. As a consequence, there is less societal pressure, if not
individual need, for litigation. The fact remains, however, that
general aviation accidents in the European Union which involve
significant injuries are far from infrequent, and, as previously
mentioned, there is no shortage of European Union citizens avail-
ing themselves of the United States civil justice system for acci-
dents occurring in Europe.6 Finally, there is an indication that in
67. Green Paper, supra note 7, at 7.
68. Again, exact statistics are not readily available. My experience has been
that roughly five to ten percent of the aviation products cases in the United States
involve foreign plaintiffs.
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some member countries recent changes in the law of negligence,
particularly in the area of burden of proof, make it more attractive
as a means of recovery than strict liability. Germany, for example,
is such a country. It is, therefore, conceivable that in some circum-
stances plaintiffs are inclined to seek relief outside of strict liabil-
ity. Finally, one very practical explanation for this situation may
be traced to Article 17 of the Directive, which excludes products
put into circulation before adoption of the legislation by the mem-
ber states. This would exclude a large number of General Aviation
products because most of them in operation today, at least fixed
wing aircraft, were built before 1988, the date for adoption by the
member states.
Based on the foregoing, it may very well be that combination
of the relative newness of strict liability under the Directive and
the restricted pool of potential affected products (including rela-
tively few accidents) explains why there has been little activity
under the Directive. This is hardly the complete story. However,
in the final analysis, these explanations are of relatively minor im-
portance because they do not get at the root causes of the difference
between the United States and European experience. It is these
differences which largely explain the state of products law under
the Directive in the European Union today, and which will no
doubt govern the future of strict liability, at least in the short term.
A. The Directive-Limiting Provisions
As previously mentioned, the history surrounding the passage
of the Directive reveals the competing interests which the Commis-
sion sought to balance. It is important to understand that the
raison d'etre of the European Union is the desire to ensure fair eco-
nomic competition among the member states.69 This is not to sug-
gest that human rights, for example, is not an end in itself for the
organization. The European Union does have a social aspect to it,
in addition to the obvious economic one. The critical point is that
market considerations form the backdrop for much of the legisla-
tion which emerges from the European Union. This was very ap-
69. See Directive, supra note 4, at preamble. See also CCH European Union
Law Reporter 164 (1997 European Union in Profile § 123) (discussing the objec-
tives of the European Union); Green Paper, supra note 7, at 10 (articulating that
one aim of the Directive is to determine whether it is jeopardizing the "competi-
tiveness of European business").
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parent in the debate surrounding strict liability. The Commission
ultimately weighed not only the interests of consumers, but those
of manufacturers and the insurance industry in making its final
decision. Such a balanced approach was decidedly not the case in
the common law courts of this country. The Commission's senti-
ment here was summed up, in its own words, when it recently
stated, "the political resolve.., to have a balanced framework of
liability governing the relationship between business and consum-
ers should not be underestimated."70 In particular, in 1985 the
Commission was reacting to the perceived excesses of products law
in the United States and its potential impact on European busi-
ness interests if strict liability was enacted. For example, in dis-
cussing the potential impact of punitive damages, it has again
concluded that the availability of such damages would adversely
affect the competitiveness of European Union manufacturers. 71
Equally troublesome was the high compensatory damage awards
which are commonplace in the United States. Specifically, today
the Commission still takes seriously the argument that high dam-
age awards would deter research and development in the Euro-
pean Union and adversely affect job creation.72 Similarly, and this
is a more subtle aspect to the debate, the Commission also appears
to have seen a competitive advantage to European Union manufac-
turers, in not having to build into their product pricing the high
costs of products liability, such as insurance premiums and high
deductibles, which prudent United States manufacturers do. In-
deed, many of the leading manufacturers of general aviation air-
craft in the United States cited "exorbitant" products liability costs
as the primary reason they discontinued or significantly curtailed
the production of piston engine aircraft in the 1980s.73 In sum, the
70. Green Paper, supra note 7, at 3.
71. See id. at 13.
72. The Commission appears to be particularly concerned about the excesses
of tobacco litigation in the United States. Interestingly, in 1996 two injured par-
ties commenced litigation in France against a French tobacco company. See Green
Paper, supra note 7, at 13 n.22 (discussing this litigation). It appears that the
plaintiffs have recently won a preliminary victory in this litigation. See David
Woodruff, French Court Rules Tobacco Firm Shares Blame for a Smoker's Death,
Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at A21.
73. The debate on the proposed legislation in both the Senate and House of
Representatives contains numerous references concerning the adverse economic
impact of strict liability on the General Aviation industry. See, e.g., Cong. Rec.,
(daily ed. Mar. 6, 1994; June 27, 1994); House Comm. on Public Works and Trans-
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Commission had no interest in erecting, or at least contributing to,
a strict liability regime which would easily lead to high damages
awards and related costs that would handicap business and, ulti-
mately, the overall economy within the European Union.
It is tempting to conclude that the concern with the United
States tort system expressed by the Commission, not to mention
the many in the business community who predicted dire conse-
quences, was exaggerated. Granted, some part of this can be at-
tributed to the hyperbole which normally accompanies any
political debate. Indeed, there appears to have been a consensus
among the more neutral observers that the Directive would not
have a dramatic impact on products law in the European Union;
certainly not to the same extent as in the United States. 74 To il-
legitimatize the concern over strict liability, however, would ignore
the profound distrust of the American tort system which many
Europeans have, particularly, members of the business and insur-
ance industry. They tend to view the excesses, real or perceived, of
products law in the United States as the norm. Given the state of
products law in the United States, including frequent huge com-
pensatory and punitive damages awards, which continue today,
this is certainly not an unreasonable concern. The recent multi-
billion dollar punitive damages award against General Motors in
California 75 and recent multi-million dollar compensatory and pu-
nitive damages awards against the Torrington Company, a United
States bearing manufacturer, 76 for example, greatly influenced the
perception Europeans have of what goes on in the United States'
civil justice system. At a minimum, verdicts such as these enforce
portation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1. As discussed above, GARA was proposed as
a jobs creation bill, as opposed to tort reform, by its proponents. This explains, in
large part, why it was willingly signed into law by President Clinton, who has
consistently disapproved of and even vetoed, proposed federal tort reform legisla-
tion. See supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
74. See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 7, at 368.
75. See Andersen v. General Motors Corp. No. BC-116926 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1999). On August 26, 1999, the trial judge reduced the $4.8 billion punitive dam-
ages award to a mere $1.09 billion, but let stand the $107 million compensatory
damages award.
76. See Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, No. 09-97-059CV, 1999 LEXIS 1288, at
*1-2, 25 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1999). The troubling aspect of this case is that the
jury awarded $50 million in punitive damages on a highly questionable record. It
is fair to say that the defendants as well as the insurance carriers were totally
unprepared for such a result. The trial judge remitted the jury award to $5 mil-
lion. The case is currently on appeal before the Texas Supreme Court.
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the belief that products law in the United States is unpredictable,
which for the insurance industry, in particular, is anathema. The
fact that product defendants in the United States win the majority
of products cases that go to verdict, that punitive damage awards
are relatively rare and that when punitive damages are awarded,
they are often greatly reduced on appeal, 77 is of small consolation.
One may reasonably argue that the fears expressed by the Com-
mission were a "straw man," particularly when the existing legal
systems which would apply strict liability were considerably more
limiting than in the United States. In any event, the Commission
was not prepared to take the chance that the strict liability regime
erected by the Directive would come anywhere close to approximat-
ing the experience of the United States. There is every reason to
believe that this remains a concern today.78
It is tempting to conclude that the Commission weighed the
interests of business too heavily. To do so, however, would be to
ignore a critical factor which greatly influenced its final decision on
the Directive. Unlike this country, the social welfare systems
throughout most of Europe are extensive and provide substantial
coverage for many of the losses which arise from a product- related
accident. The various welfare schemes in the European Union pro-
vide generous, at least by our standards, benefits for medical and
rehabilitation costs and even lost wages. Thus, the State as a
whole bears most of the cost of product-caused harm; whereas, in
the United States, products liability is the primary mechanism for
compensation in this area. As the Commission has noted: "[i]n this
respect, producer liability is regarded as an instrument of compen-
sation which is complementary to the other ways in which a victim
can obtain redress."7 9 There is even a sense that what the Com-
mission really had in mind was to provide a mechanism to address
significant losses, even catastrophic ones, which required more
77. See Berkman, supra note 57, at Al (This article discusses a recent Depart-
ment of Justice statistical study of the United States' civil justice system. The
study also seems to conclude that there has been a decline in the median amount
of punitive damages awarded in several important counties.). Nevertheless, there
is no shortage of huge compensatory verdicts in products case in the United States
today. See generally Margaret Cronin Fisk, Verdicts are Very High but Also Very
Volatile, Nat'l L.J., at C7-C28 (Feb. 22, 1999) (Supp.) (providing examples of huge
compensatory verdicts in malpractice cases in the United States).
78. See supra note 75.
79. Green Paper, supra note 7, at 16 (emphasis added).
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than the social safety net.80 Thus, it is fair to say that while the
Commission certainly wanted to make injured parties "whole,"
which is one, if not the most important, goal of the tort system in
the United States, it did so within the context of a system where
medical care, rehabilitation and even basic economic subsistence
were the priority of the state. Moreover, the various social safety
schemes are financed by a combination of tax dollars and contribu-
tions from industry. Subrogation by the state or direct providers
also appears to be virtually non-existent across the European
Union, with the possible of exception of Germany. This would ap-
pear to be the ultimate "risk-spreading" mechanism. To have man-
ufacturers contribute yet again through tort suits arguably
amounts to a double tax, which would further increase the cost of
doing business.
In light of the foregoing, the Commission's decision on strict
liability is understandable. As a practical matter, there was no
need to replicate United States products law in its entirety because
to do so would create redundant compensation for those injured by
defective products. At the same time, the Commission recognized
the need to create an easier means of recovery for injured parties,
for those damages which could not be taken care of by the various
social welfare systems. Equally important, the Commission did
not want to erect a compensation scheme which unnecessarily dis-
advantaged the interests of business to the point where the overall
economic well-being of the European Union itself would be
affected.
In sum, the Commission sought to strike a balance between
the interests of business and consumers which made economic
sense from an overall market perspective. The outcome of this pro-
cess is reflected in the adoption of strict liability itself and the
other factors which have been discussed. Balanced against this
are several procedural and substantive defenses, which generally
are not available in the United States or, at least, are greatly re-
stricted.8 1 For example, the Directive provides for a ten-year stat-
ute of repose which runs from the date the product is put into
circulation.8 2 While some states in the United States have stat-
80. See id. at 16-17.
81. See Directive, supra note 4, at art. 7. For a fuller discussion of these de-
fenses, see Fobe II, supra note 25, at 44-52 and Hodges, supra note 23, at 70-86.
82. See Directive, supra note 4, at art. 11.
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utes of repose, they are relatively rare. The eighteen-year federal
statute of repose for general aviation products under GARA is gen-
erous from the plaintiffs perspective when compared to ten years
under the Directive. When one considers that more than seventy
percent of the United States manufactured general aviation air-
craft worldwide are over eighteen years old, it is clear that general
aviation product manufacturers are even better positioned in the
European Union under the Directive's lesser limitation period.
The Directive also provides an affirmative defense for compliance
with "mandatory" government regulations, which also is not gener-
ally available under strict liability in the United States.8 3 Again,
general aviation manufacturers, in particular, are well-positioned
to take advantage of this defense because their industry is highly
regulated, both here and in Europe;8 4 although there is reason to
question whether this defense is nearly as strong as defendants
would like it to be.8 5 The Directive also permits the reduction of
awards by the plaintiffs' comparative negligence, which is more
common in the United States, but not universal, under strict
liability.
The most controversial defense, which was one of the major
stumbling blocks to the Directive's passage, is the so-called "devel-
opmental risks defense" which is similar to the state of the art de-
fense in the United States. This defense is generally unavailable in
the United States as an absolute defense in strict liability cases.
The debate surrounding this defense was particularly intense. Not
only was the business community opposed to it,86 even the Euro-
83. See id. at art. 7(d) (stating that "the defect is due to compliance of the
product with mandatory regulations issued by public authorities").
84. For a thorough discussion of the regulatory regimes which govern the avi-
ation industry in the Europe, see Fobe II, supra note 25, at 11-34. Fobe makes the
point that along with attempting to harmonize products law, the European Union
is moving in the direction of unifying the regulatory scheme for the aviation indus-
try. It appears that the United States system under the FAA will be the model.
85. See id. at 46. See also Hodges, supra note 23, at 75 (concluding that "mere
compliance with regulations or mandatory standards ... is no defence to liability
for a defective product"). He argues that the defendant will be required to show
that the defect itself was "caused by such compliance or was its inevitable result."
Id. He does conclude, however, that compliance with regulations may still be rele-
vant to the issue of defect, particularly in design defect cases. Id. at 75 n.90-91.
86. Not surprisingly, the aviation industry was particularly vocal in support of
a strong defense. See Fobe II, supra note 25, at 49 and text accompanying note 57.
Indeed, as Fobe indicates, the aviation industry was strongly opposed to strict lia-
bility itself. Id. For the insurance industry's position on the developmental risk
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pean Parliament took the somewhat unusual step of intervening
late in the process to ensure it was not too restrictive.8 7 Again, a
compromise was struck between competing interests: the defense
was permitted, but made optional.88 The defense provides that the
manufacturer may use this defense when "the state of the scientific
and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into
circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to
be discovered."8 9 Most of the member states have chosen to adopt
it.90
Why product manufacturers considered this defense impor-
tant is obvious. While it has little relevance to manufacturing de-
fect cases, it is very germane to design and failure to warn cases,
which make up the vast majority of products litigation. Cases in-
volving allegations of design or failure to warn defects are gener-
ally more complex and, thus, tend to involve more subjective
factors. Given the subjective nature of the test, manufacturers are
at a disadvantage. The general aviation context illustrates how
the defense benefits manufacturers. Aircraft manufacturers have
an inherent advantage in cases which involve highly technical is-
sues such as design decisions because they know the product and
the industry as a whole much better than consumers and their
counsel. Given the limited discovery available throughout the Eu-
ropean Union, it is highly unlikely that the plaintiff is going to be
defense, which was similar to that of the aviation manufacturers, see Green Paper,
supra note 7, at 24 n.49. On the other hand, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland
and Luxembourg were in favor of excluding the state of the art defense. See Fobe
II, supra note 25, at 50.
87. Their recommendation was that "[tihe producer shall not be liable if he
can produce evidence that the article cannot be considered defective in light of the
scientific and technological development at the time when the article was put into
circulation." 1976 O.J. (C241) 11, as quoted in Griffiths, supra note 7, at 389. The
Parliament expressly sought to counter the language proposed by the Commission
which sought to open the inquiry to the state of scientific and technological knowl-
edge after the product was put into circulation. Id. (emphasis added).
88. See Directive, supra note 4, at art. 15(1)(b).
89. Id. For a discussion of the iterative process which led to the final version,
see Griffiths, supra note 7, at 388-89. For a cogent analysis of the parameters of
the defense, see Hodges, supra note 23, at 75-80. Hodges concludes that the de-
fense may not be nearly as strong as defendants think it is. Id. at 79-80.
90. Luxembourg, Finland and Norway are the only member states which have
chosen not to adopt the defense in any form. See Green Paper, supra note 7, at
annex 1. France appears to have excluded it, not surprisingly, for "products de-
rived from the human body," an obvious reference to the problems it faced recently
with HIV contaminated blood. Id.
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able to make all or part of his case from the defendant's own docu-
ments, which is more common here. Equally important, the ab-
sence of juries and the wide use of court appointed or controlled
experts, significantly reduces the subjective element in the liability
decision-making process. The defense is nevertheless susceptible
to expansive application not unlike the definition of defect. It is far
from clear on several important issues and there is even some sug-
gestion that it is not as powerful a weapon as manufacturers would
like.91 The fact remains, however, that on its face the defense of-
fers product manufacturers a powerful weapon to ward off liability.
Moreover, as long as injured parties perceive it as such, it will be a
disincentive to commence litigation, particularly in those countries
which present other substantial hurdles to recovery.
The controversy surrounding this defense did not end with the
Directive. The United Kingdom has its own version of this defense
which is more favorable to the product defendant. 92 The United
Kingdom was sued in the European Court of Justice because the
Commission concluded that the United Kingdom's version of the
defense was in conflict with the Directive's and, thus, violated the
principle of harmonization of law. Surprisingly, the Court upheld
the United Kingdom's position.93 As will be discussed presently,
the debate over the developmental risks defense is still very much
alive today.94 Indeed, it remains controversial precisely because
on its face, if not in practice, it presents a formidable hurdle to
plaintiffs, particularly in cases which involve complex technical
cases.
In sum, the Directive itself presents those injured by products
with several obstacles, which although not insurmountable, are
nonetheless daunting. The full impact of the Directive becomes
clearer when one takes into account how it is applied by the vari-
ous members' legal systems.
91. See generally Hodges, supra note 23, at 75-80 (describing the state of
knowledge and discoverability aspects of the defense).
92. See supra note 64 and discussion therein.
93. See id.
94. See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 22-23 (quoting that this was "one of the
most controversial aspects of the debate").
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B. Applying Strict Liability in the European Union-Further
Limitations
It has long been this author's contention that two of the pri-
mary influences on products law in the United States are activist
state court judges who are willing to shape the common law to
meet perceived societal needs, and juries imbued with a wealth
distribution and anti-business mentality 5 Place these factors in a
civil justice system, which allows for virtually unlimited discovery,
contingent fees, experts as "hired guns," and most importantly,
damage schemes which invite huge awards, and the results are
hardly surprising. Most of these factors either do not exist or are
minimized in the European Union.
For all intents and purpose, punitive damages are not avail-
able in the typical product suit in the European Union. Some of
the legal systems, such as France and the United Kingdom, do al-
low for the possibility of such damages or damages similar in con-
cept, but the defendant's conduct normally would need to approach
the criminal.9 6 Moreover, the underlying accident would have to
involve injuries which would attract the attention of society as a
whole, if not the government, which in Europe often ends up push-
ing the matter into the criminal context, which tends to make dam-
ages of any kind the least of the product defendant's worries.9 7 In
any event, it is not uncommon in the United States for plaintiffs to
add punitive damages' counts to product litigation, if only to raise
the stakes; thereby, prompting a favorable settlement.
Compensatory ("material") damages are also generally less
high throughout the European Union, although the United King-
95. See generally Spacone, supra note 3, at 2, 28-31 (discussing how the judici-
ary appears to have taken the role of activist when shaping the common law in this
area and how juries are embodied with 'the values and beliefs of America").
96. See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 23, at 678 (discussing the availability of puni-
tive damages in the United Kingdom). See id. at 176-77 [Table 41 (for a survey of
punitive damages across the European Union).
97. See, for example, arts. 121-1, 223-1 of the French Penal Code (1992), which
provided criminal sanctions against product manufacturers, inter alia, who expose
someone to risk of death, injury, etc., by "clearly intentional violation" of a specific
duty of care or safety imposed by a law or regulation; Fobe I, supra note 18, at 169-
70. As Fobe states, this provision would clearly apply to aviation manufacturers.
See id. It would also appear to apply to any product manufacturer covered by the
European Union's consumer protection legislation.
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dom appears to be an exception in this regard. 98 "Moral damages,"
such as pain and suffering, while allowed in many jurisdictions,
are generally much lower than in the United States.99 Equally im-
portant, at least two of the member states require that the plaintiff
either opt out of the social welfare program before commencing liti-
gation' 00 or apply any benefits as an offset to recovery obtained in
litigation.' 0 ' Both instances are extremely rare in the United
States, if they exist at all. As a general rule, plaintiffs in the
United States can recover medical costs, for example, even if they
are covered by insurance or some other means. While subrogation
by insurance providers, for example, is available to restore some
balance to the equation, its application is uneven and it has been
my experience that full repayment is rare. Not surprisingly, the
Commission seems to endorse the concept of setting off damages
from covered social welfare programs, against damages awarded in
litigation; this is consistent with its notion that strict liability is
"complementary" to other means of recovery. 10 2
The disparity between damages in the European Union and
this country is only one factor which tends to deter injured victims
from pursing litigation, at least in the European Union. Equally
important is the absence of juries in the European Union for civil
suits, even in the United Kingdom which most closely resembles
98. See, e.g., Margaret A. Jacobs, Swissair Crash Test Relations with Insurers,
Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 2000, at B1 ("Courts outside the United States typically award
a third less of what United States courts do in wrongful death cases."). For a sur-
vey of the damage schemes across the European Union, see Hodges, supra note 23,
at 180 [Table 6]. Perhaps, the European Union country which comes closest to the
United States in terms of the size of awards is the UK. For a discussion of the
damage regime in the UK, see id. at 678-83. Recently, there has been a decision by
the House of Lords and a change to the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act of
1997 which raise considerably the amount of compensatory damages available to
injured parties. See Insurance Update: Personal Injury Multipliers-The End of the
Uncertainty? (Aug. 1998) (prepared by members of the London insurance market)
(on file with author).
99. For a discussion of "moral damages" in the European Union, see Hodges,
supra note 23, at 163-66; for a survey, see id. at 176-77 [Table 4].
100. Griffiths points to UK legislation which was in effect in 1988. See Grif-
fiths, supra note 7, at 392. The author has not determined as of the date of this
article whether this legislation is still in effect.
101. See Belgian Legislation of 1991 (Article 14) ("[bleneficiaries of a social se-
curity scheme must first take advantage of rights deriving from such a scheme. If
there is any damage not covered, the victim must then enforce his rights against
the producer under liability"); Green Paper, supra note 7, at 16.
102. See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 16.
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our civil justice system. The impact of this is obvious, particularly
given the open-ended nature of the test for defect. The plaintiff
again has lost a powerful tool for recovery. This leaves the judge or
magistrate to make the liability determination. It would be incor-
rect to conclude that judges are immune from subjective thinking.
This is human nature. We have already seen some evidence that
some jurists in the European Union may be disposed towards
plaintiffs in products lawsuits, particularly those involving air-
craft. This is only speculation, but it may very well be that they
are willing to expand the parameters of liability (e.g., shift the bur-
den of proof on liability from the plaintiff to the defendant) and
even find liability in the first instance, while at the same time they
are unwilling to award sizeable damages. If a recent study of
United States judges is to be believed, this is the case in the United
States.10 3 Moreover, while it is fair to say that jurists in Europe
are not nearly as activist as their counterparts in the United
States, they can be independent in their decision-making. It is fair
to say, however, that in the main, judges in the European Union
approach decision-making in a more constrained way than their
counterparts in the United States do, and certainly than most ju-
ries do. It is also hard to imagine that they would engage in the
activist practices which occasioned the development of strict liabil-
ity in the United States and continue to this day. There is little
historical precedent for this. Most of the civil justice systems are
not based on the common law, but on statutory jurisprudence,
which constrains their creativity. The Directive itself greatly lim-
its their ability to "experiment" by laying out several ground rules
or guidelines, including the defenses discussed herein. As pointed
out previously, the Directive itself prevents the member states
from changing the parameters of strict liability.
With the exception of the United Kingdom (and there is strong
indication that this is about change to some degree, as will be dis-
cussed below), judges play a very active role in the overall manage-
ment of litigation. For example, in several of the member states
the presiding judge appoints the expert to assist with fact gather-
ing and the liability analysis. Even in those jurisdictions, such as
the United Kingdom, which until recently have allowed the parties
to select their own experts free of any court intervention, the
103. See Berkman, supra note 57, at Al.
20001 STRICT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 371
judges will exercise some control over their conduct. Thus, the ex-
pert as a "hired gun," while not entirely unknown in the European
Union, carries less influence on the trier of fact than in the United
States. Similarly, judges in the European Union exercise more
(some would say total for Continental Europe) 0 4 control over the
discovery process, which in itself is vastly more limited than in the
United States. Depositions are almost unheard of in Germany.1'0
For example, it would be the rare lawsuit (with the possible excep-
tion of the United Kingdom) that witnesses the use of discovery as
an in terroreum weapon, a not infrequent occurrence in high stakes
products litigation in the United States. Again, an important aid
to recovery is largely unavailable to potential plaintiffs in the Eu-
ropean Union.
Three other important procedural factors merit brief mention.
With the exception of the United Kingdom and a few other member
states which allow a limited form, contingent fees do not exist in
the European Union.' 0 6 Rightly or wrongly, many products law-
suits in the United States would never see the courthouse without
the contingent fee system. The situation is not improved from the
plaintiffs perspective when you add to the mix that in many mem-
ber countries, the loser runs the risk of paying all or part of the
court costs, and in some instances all or part of the winner's legal
fees. 10 7 It should be noted that in some countries plaintiffs may
avail themselves of legal aid in products, as well as other litiga-
104. See, e.g., E. Blake Redding, A Comity of Errors-Europeans Discover Discov-
ery, 18 ACCA Docket 47 (Jan. 2000). See also Hodges, supra note 23, at 174-77
[Table 4], for a survey of discovery across the European Union. Hodges' survey
seems to conclude that the widespread practice is that discovery is at the discre-
tion of the parties. Moreover, several of the member states require that "all rele-
vant" documents be produced. This would seem to contradict to some degree the
conclusion of the author in the ACCA article. The reality, however, is that docu-
ment discovery is very limited across the European Union. It certainly is no where
near as burdensome as in the United States. Depositions are even more restricted
in scope as well as number. The UK, at least until recently, has been the exception
to this rule.
105. For a general discussion of discovery in Germany, see Socite Nationale
Industrielle Agrospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 558
(1987).
106. See Hodges, supra note 23, at 162 (stating that "contingency fees are
rare"); see id. at 174-75 [Table 4], for a survey of contingency fees in the European
Union.
107. See id. at 162, 174-77 [Table 4], for survey of the European Union on this
topic.
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tion.108 It would appear, however, that because of certain restric-
tions on such aid, it is not much of a factor in deciding to bring a
products lawsuit. Given the high hurdles to products litigation dis-
cussed, the absence of a well-developed contingent fee system and
the "loser pays" principle provides further disincentive to litiga-
tion. Finally, with the exception of Portugal, class actions per se
also do not exist in the European Union. 109 This is not to suggest
that certain types of claims can not be aggregated or grouped for
litigation purposes. France has procedures which allow this, 110
The fact remains, however, that the general unavailability of the
class action device lessens the likelihood that massive asbestosis
litigation of the type in the United States, for example, will occur
in the European Union. Again, plaintiffs do not have available to
them a potentially powerful weapon against product
manufacturers.
The final factor which merits attention is cultural. By any
test, Europeans are not nearly as litigious as Americans. Some
might argue that this is so because the various legal systems are
more restrictive and, thus, deter litigation in all but extreme cases.
Such thinking is flawed because it ignores the fundamental fact
that the legal systems, as in the United States,"' are the product
of the prevailing social and cultural forces in Europe and not the
other way around. There certainly is no evidence that Europeans
are more docile about asserting individual rights than Americans.
Anyone who is knowledgeable concerning the social and labor his-
tory in France, for example, would quickly realize that the French
are not shy about expressing their displeasure with institutions, to
put it mildly. Yet, it was France which was the last country to
implement the Directive, and that was not without a struggle.
While the answer to this question is complex, there is no gainsay-
ing that the presence of a well-developed social welfare program,
108. See id. Hodges seems to suggest that the "loser pays" principle is not as
important a consideration in deciding to commence litigation as some might think.
Given the historically high cost of litigation in the UK, caused in large part by
freewheeling discovery on the part of defense lawyers, it would certainly seem that
a major factor is whether to bring a products suit in that country.
109. See id. at 161, 174-75 [Table 41.
110. See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 33.
111. See generally Spacone, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that strict liability is a
doctrine firmly rooted in the United States and is unlikely to be changed unless
American values and beliefs change).
2000] STRICT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 373
which embodies the principle that the state is the primary protec-
tor of citizens who suffer economic misfortune of any type, plays a
major role in shaping how Europeans approach litigation. These
programs provide a safety valve for compensation, if you will,
which is not available in the United States. In short, the tort sys-
tem is not perceived to be the primary means of compensation for
product harm. Americans tend to forget that the European polit-
ical experience, at least on the Continent, has a significant socialis-
tic aspect to it. The citizens of these nations give up certain rights
in exchange for the State's more paternalistic role in their lives.
This explains in large part why the transfer of Chief Justice Tray-
nor's rationale for strict liability was not given the same reception
in Europe: the governmental systems and cultural and social pred-
icates are very different.
There is one other important consideration which is not easily
susceptible to documentation and which is certainly controversial.
It has been my experience that Americans, for whatever reason,
are more comfortable under strict liability than Europeans are be-
cause whether the product manufacturer is at fault is largely irrel-
evant. The tendency here is to place responsibility for product-
caused harm on the manufacturer, regardless of whether they are
at fault morally or legally. The manufacturer produced the prod-
uct; it failed; the user was hurt; the manufacturer (or its insurer)
can more than afford to pay; end of story. Europeans appear to
have a somewhat different sense of personal responsibility. It is
not apparent that they are willing to jump to the conclusion that
simply because they were injured by a product, the manufacturer
should pay absent some indication of fault. Similarly, they appear
to be more willing to accept responsibility for their conduct when it
contributes to the accident (admittedly easier to do when you have
a well-developed social welfare system to fall back on for compen-
sation). Incorporating comparative negligence under strict liabil-
ity, for example, appears never to have been a debatable point for
the Commission, unlike in the United States. Also, in dealing with
a variety of legal issues in the European Union, I have come away
with the impression that Europeans also have more respect for
business than people in the United States do. The foregoing leads
to the conclusion that Europeans are willing to give manufacturers
a free pass when they are injured by their products. It also sug-
gests, however, an attitude which is less likely to spawn wide-
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spread product litigation, absent other compelling reasons.
Whether this attitude will change is unknown, but as long as it
exists, it will be an additional factor which limits the expansion of
strict liability in theory as well as practice.
In summary, the social, cultural and institutional forces
aligned in the European Union have produced a much more lim-
ited form of strict liability than in the United States. This is re-
flected in the structure of the Directive itself and in the various
legal systems which apply this doctrine. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that strict liability has taken such a different course in the
European Union. There is some indication, however, that changes,
although not dramatic, may be underway, which could influence
the direction of strict liability in the European Union.
IV. THE FUTURE OF STRICT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. The Directive: Time for Change?
As previously mentioned, the Commission does not regard the
Directive to be the final answer on the shape of strict liability.
This would seem to imply that revisions in favor of injured parties
are contemplated, or at least, subject to study. To date, however,
there has been little change of any consequence to manufacturers.
In 1995, the Commission's five-year review resulted in no recom-
mendations for change, in large part because the data was limited.
In response to the "mad cow crisis," the Directive was applied to
unprocessed agricultural products in 1999.112 Again, the Commis-
sion was responding to a situation which involved mass exposure
to injury that clearly caught the attention of Europeans.
In March of 1999, the Commission issued its "Green Paper,"
which established the guidelines for the most detailed study of the
Directive to date. 113 The introduction to the Green Paper makes it
evident that the Commission has not abandoned its over-arching
goal of balancing the needs of consumers and business (including
the insurance industry) in order to achieve an overall market solu-
tion which makes economic sense. 114 It is also clear that the body
112. See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 7.
113. See generally Green Paper, supra note 7, at 2, 7-9 (discussing the scope of
the study).
114. See id. at 3. The terms "balanced" and "compromise" are used numerous
times throughout the document.
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does not wish to engage in a debate dominated by hyperbole, a fre-
quent hallmark of the debate surrounding federal and state tort
reform in the United States. As part of this process, comments
from all interested parties have been requested. The Commission
has made it clear, however, that it wants only "facts," as opposed to
"positions of principle."115 This would seem to indicate that it has
moved from a debate, which heavily involved theoretical considera-
tions, to one centered on quantitative data involving the cost of
strict liability to business, as well as benefits to consumers. One
cannot help wonder whether the Commission is reacting to the
state of the debate on tort reform in the United States. It has been
my experience that the proponents of tort reform here have failed
in large part because they have been unable to make a quantita-
tive case. The major exception to this has been GARA, which
although not characterized as tort reform per se, was successful
because the General Aviation industry was able to make precisely
the type of economic case that the Commission appeared to be in-
terested in.
The Commission has targeted several major aspects of the Di-
rective for study. These include the issue of shifting the burden of
proof from plaintiffs to defendants, the ten-year statute of repose,
including "its possible modification," and "implementation of the
execution in the case of the 'developmental risks' and assessment
of its possible abolition."1 6 The Commission also appears to be
interested in amending the Directive to include class actions. 117 In
keeping with its aim of gathering hard data, the Commission in-
tends to compile an "index" of the "number and content of judg-
ments, proceedings settled out of court, number of claims made,"
etc. 1 8 Similarly, it is looking for input from the business commu-
nity on the impact of strict liability on research and development,
production, selling prices and even insurance premiums.119
115. See id. at 9-10. The Commission appears to want to avoid the hyperbole,
on both sides of the issue, which has characterized the debate surrounding federal
tort reform in the United States for at least the last fifteen years. This is a desira-
ble objective, and it should be interesting to see what reception the Commission
gives to traditional "fairness" arguments, which it is bound to receive despite its
admonishment to the contrary.
116. Id. at 3.
117. See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 32-33.
118. Id. at 9.
119. See id. at 2.
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It will be interesting to see what the Commission ultimately
learns from this process, particularly because there does not ap-
pear to be any existing compendium of the "costs" or effects of strict
liability today. What the Commission will do with the data is an-
other question altogether. If it shows that there is no material in-
crease in litigation, or even claims under the Directive, this may
support expanding strict liability. At the same time, a modicum of
impact in these areas (at least in the general aviation context, it is
highly unlikely that significant activity will be shown) may be
enough for the Commission to conclude that no changes need to be
made. It is hard to imagine that the manufacturing or insurance
industries will be able to demonstrate that strict liability has had
an adverse impact on them. If the data should result in the conclu-
sion that there has been little activity under the Directive, this will
certainly support the position of those who want to expand the
scope of strict liability. On the other hand, just because there is
little activity under the Directive does not necessarily mean that it
is not working. In the final analysis, the answer may be that the
Directive simply has not had enough time to work itself into the
consciousness of consumers, and even the legal community, to as-
sess its full impact.
Another important consideration is that the Green Paper
states that one of the aims of the Directive is to discourage the
marketing of unsafe products.120 This would seem to belie the con-
clusion of some observers that the deterrence rationale was rela-
tively unimportant to the Commission. 121 On the other hand,
there appears to be an acceptance, at least in the United States,
that products are safer today,122 and that the presence of sophisti-
cated "Consumer Product Protection" legislation, which was en-
acted in 1992 and is similar in scope to the Consumer Protection
120. See id.
121. See supra note 7.
122. Apparently, the European Parliament has recently taken the position that
the Directive is not sufficiently effective in promoting the manufacture of safe
products. See id. at 15. This is a curious position given that the European Union
has fairly tough consumer protection legislation similar to the United States Con-
sumer Protection Act. This legislation provides for criminal remedies and recalls,
as opposed to civil damages for personal injuries. In the United States, the pres-
ence of consumer protection legislation carries little weight in the debate over the
parameters of product law. My sense is that this is not the case in the European
Union, which tends to view the courts as less of a tool for achieving societal goals
than in the United States.
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Act in the United States, renders unlikely the need to strengthen
strict liability as a deterrent. Several of the member states have
also enacted similar legislation. 123 If this is so, the primary focus
will be on whether consumers are benefiting from a recovery per-
spective, balanced against the burdens on the business community.
Accurately predicting whether the Commission will recom-
mend major changes to the Directive is almost impossible from the
perspective of an outsider, especially an American observer. The
Green Paper, with the exception of some of the points discussed
above, gives little indication of the direction in which the Commis-
sion is heading, other than recognizing that there are controversial
issues which need to be dealt with. Clearly, if the Commission con-
cludes that the social welfare programs of the member countries
are being reduced, a fundamental premise behind its thinking will
have changed. There is an indication that some change is under-
way. There is intense pressure throughout Europe, particularly in
France and Germany, whose economies have stagnated in recent
years, to reduce costly social welfare programs and, thus, increase
their competitiveness. There is no indication, however, that the
French government is interested in material changes. It is even
more problematic in Germany; even there, however, popular resist-
ance makes significant reductions unlikely any time soon. It is
hard to imagine, therefore, in the short run, that the Commission
will recommend any major changes to the Directive in the near fu-
ture because the social safety net is in jeopardy.
The ten-year statute of repose and the developmental risks de-
fense present interesting challenges for other reasons. As previ-
ously mentioned, most general aviation aircraft and many of their
component parts, such as engines, are considerably more than ten
years old, both in the United States and the European Union.
Thus, all things being equal, general aviation manufacturers in the
European Union, like in the United States, have available to them
an important means of reducing costs. Statutes of repose are the
most effective type of "tort reform" because they bar the plaintiff
from the courtroom in the first instance. It is important to con-
sider that the major "selling point" of GARA in the United States
was that it would provide thousands of jobs in the general aviation
123. See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 23 (defining the individual member states'
legislation regarding product liability).
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industry by freeing up the huge costs associated with products lia-
bility for manufacturing, which for some companies such as the
Cessna Aircraft Company, had been severely limited prior to
GARA. 124 While the situation in the European Union from the
general aviation industry is not tantamount to the United States
experience (e.g., high damage awards are rare), there is sufficient
similarity to get the Commission's attention. Moreover, the gen-
eral aviation industry in the European Union is not insubstantial.
Eliminating the statute of repose would ipso facto make European
aviation manufacturers less competitive with their United States
counterparts who operate under GARA. More important, if the
elimination of the statute of repose were to result in more frequent
litigation against manufacturers along with higher damage
awards, it would increase their costs. This in turn could result in
decreased manufacturing with attendant loss ofjobs. A safe course
for the Commission would be to lengthen the statute of repose, as
opposed to eliminating it altogether. It could certainly point to
some states in the United States which have adopted such meas-
ures, 125 although they generally are in the ten year range. If it
only had to deal with the general aviation industry this would be
one thing. But the potentially adverse consequences for those
product manufacturers, whose products have a much shorter life,
is quite another. The automotive industry, for example, would no
doubt look askance on any lengthening of the statute of repose.
While the general aviation industry may be important to the Euro-
pean Union, it pales in comparison to the automotive industry.
The developmental risks defense is another matter entirely. It
would seem to be more of a target for change. It has certainly been
controversial from the outset, which the Commission itself ac-
knowledges. 126 Moreover, redefining its scope would have less of a
direct impact on product manufacturers than jettisoning the stat-
ute of repose. Product manufacturers would still have several
other defenses available to them, not to mention the advantages
provided by the various legal systems. If, as previously discussed,
124. See GARA, supra note 2.
125. See Response of the Defense Research Institute to the Green Paper: Liabil-
ity For Defective Products, As Issued By the Commission of The European Com-
munities on 28.07.1999, at 17 n.29 [hereinafter Response of the DRI] (providing
examples of states which have statutes of repose).
126. See supra note 94.
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the defense is not as strong as some believe it to be, the Commis-
sion may conclude that it should remain intact but clarify its scope.
To remove it entirely from consideration in determining whether a
product is defective would seem extreme. As stated, many of the
jurisdictions in the United States which do not view it as an abso-
lute defense, recognize that at a minimum it should be a factor in
determining defect. 127 Moreover, elimination of the defense would
make product manufacturers responsible for technical changes
which were unknowable at the time their products were put into
circulation. This outcome would come very close to imposing abso-
lute liability, a concept which the Commission has already re-
jected. The Commission also could theoretically take away some of
the defense's advantages, real or perceived, by changing some of
the limiting aspects of the legal systems (e.g., limited discovery,
allowing for higher damage awards, permitting recovery for "moral
damages"). For example, the Commission might consider ex-
panding discovery of product manufacturers to allow plaintiffs
greater access to certain critical information (e.g., manufacturing
processes). It would seem that the European Parliament, through
the established principle of harmonization, would have the juris-
diction to achieve such results. While this may be simplistic, if the
European Union can impose a common currency among its mem-
bers, why not a common strict liability scheme which deals with
many of the procedural barriers of the member states' legal sys-
tems in a manner consistent with affording more opportunity for
injured parties? Whether the Parliament has the power to do this
is largely irrelevant, however, because there is little evidence that
there is a need for such a radical step at this time or that given the
numerous other controversial issues it faces, that it would be in-
clined to embark on such a course today.
Finally, shifting the burden of proof from plaintiffs to defend-
ants on the issue of liability and damages may present an easier
"fix" for the Commission. As previously discussed, many of the
member states have already accomplished this as part of their neg-
ligence schemes. Incorporating this change in the Directive, there-
fore, would certainly not be without precedence. The business
community is certain to be opposed to this, however, because it is
127. For a cogent argument in favor of returning to the state of the art defense,
as well as the developmental risks defense itself, see Response of the DRI, supra
note 125, at 9-15.
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one thing to shift the burden of proof in negligence, where proving
fault is the overriding consideration, as opposed to strict liability,
where it has been eliminated as a factor.
In summary, whether the Commission will recommend funda-
mental changes is problematic absent some compelling evidence
that the Directive is not achieving the Commission's stated objec-
tives. The Commission will certainly consider whether the welfare
programs of the member states are continuing to provide an ac-
ceptable level of compensation for product caused harm. It is also
likely to focus on the impact of existing consumer protection legis-
lation on the production of unsafe products. Without more infor-
mation, one gets the sense that it will be difficult to convince the
Commission that this legislation is not working. Even if major
changes are made to the doctrine itself, they would have impact
absent fundamental changes to the civil justice systems of the
member states.
B. The United Kingdom Civil Justice System-Potential
Changes?
Historically, the civil justice system in the United Kingdom
has closely resembled the United States model. Our system of ju-
risprudence is essentially based on the English common law sys-
tem, although there have been some significant differences, such
as the contingent fee system and jury trials. In essence, until re-
cently, the civil justice system in the United Kingdom basically has
followed the "party-control" model of jurisprudence, which tends to
relegate the judge to a secondary role and leaves it to the parties to
largely control the litigation, subject of course, to the prevailing
procedural rules such as discovery, evidence and the like. Not sur-
prisingly, unlike most of the other members of the European
Union, litigation in the United Kingdom can be expensive. Indeed,
discovery is often used as a device by defendants to prolong the
litigation, if not to inflict high costs on plaintiffs. This becomes a
particular problem for plaintiffs because of the "loser pays" princi-
ple. Moreover, the dominant basis for recovery for product harm,
at least before the introduction of strict liability under the Direc-
tive, was negligence. As previously noted, negligence law placed
several difficult hurdles in the path of plaintiffs seeking recovery.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that products litigation in
the United Kingdom, has historically been limited. There is some
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indication, however, that this is about to change because of the so-
called "Woolf Reforms, which applied to the country's civil practice
rules."128
Enacted into law in 1999, these changes essentially seek to re-
form over 100 years of civil jurisprudence in the United Kingdom.
The impetus for these changes was prompted, in part, by a concern
that recovery for consumers was too difficult, costly and time con-
suming, particularly in matters which did not involve significant
sums. 129 Lord Woolf and his supporters were also motivated by
the sense that incentives needed to be provided to avoid litigation
in the first instance, not only for the benefit of plaintiffs, but also
for the courts themselves, which were becoming burdened with liti-
gation. While the reforms were not aimed at products suits specifi-
cally, they certainly sweep this area of the law within their scope.
Under the new Civil Procedure Rules, the claimant is required
early in the process (actually, pre-suit) to set out his or her position
on recovery and deliver this to the prospective defendant. 130 The
defense, in turn, is required to state its position in a fairly detailed
manner. Failure to do so can result in the imposition of costs by
the court or other forms of prejudice. 131 Discovery is significantly
curtailed, at least initially, and personal verification of all re-
sponses by the defendant is required with penalties for "untruth-
fulness."132 Also, the use of a single expert, as opposed to each
party retaining their own, is "encouraged," and it is made clear
128. Civil Procedure Rules (Jan. 29, 1999), effective Apr. 26, 1999 [hereinafter
CPR]. These rules were the culmination of a lengthy study by Lord Woolf, Master
of The Rolls (most senior civil judge), which were presented in 1996 as the "Access
to Justice." For a thorough discussion of the Rules, see The Civil Procedure Rules
of 1999: The Details and Some Key Issues (1999), prepared by Allen & Overy, an
international law firm based in London, England. This is an unpublished paper
prepared for clients of the firm, which is on file with the author.
129. In an article that appeared in The Economist in 1996, contemporary with
the release of Lord Woolfs report, the author concluded: "If Lord Woolfs changes
are implemented, he will have brought about by far the biggest revolution in the
civil-justice system in Britain this century." More Justice is More Just, Economist,
July 27, 1996, at 15.
130. CPR, supra note 128, at pt. 7, § B.
131. Id. at pt. 12.
132. Part 22 of the CPR introduces the concept of the "Statement of Truth."
This is a signed statement incorporated at the end of key court documents, by
which the content of those documents is verified to be true and accurate. See CPR,
supra note 128, at rule 22.1. Rule 32.14 sets out the consequence for making a
false statement.
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that any expert permitted by the court owes his or her primary
allegiance to the court. 133 Another significant change is the option
(and strong incentive) for the parties to resolve disputes through a
variety of Alternative Dispute Resolutions.' 34 The Rules also al-
low for "offers to settle" all or part of the dispute by both sides,
again with potentially significant consequences in terms of costs
for the failure to accept such offers. 135 Further, consistent with the
objective of ending litigation early, the test for summary judgment,
now available to either party, has been changed to "no real pros-
pect of success," which is a far cry for the test of "no material issue
of fact" in the United States. 136 Finally, it is apparent from the
Rules that the judge will have greater control over the actual con-
duct of the litigation. Whether this spells the end to the traditional
party-controlled model remains to be seen. It is clear, however,
that it is considerably weakened.
It is too early to tell what impact the Woolf Reforms will have
on general aviation products litigation, let alone any products liti-
gation, in the United Kingdom. It will be interesting to see how
quickly the judiciary and bar accept such a radical departure from
over a century of jurisprudence. On their face, however, these
changes do provide opportunities as well as pitfalls for both sides
to a products dispute involving strict liability. Many manufactur-
ers in the United States would welcome the availability of a less-
ened test for summary judgment, increased reliance on a single
court appointed expert, the potential of less intrusive discovery
and even more control of the parties by the trial judge. Offers of
settlement could also be a useful tool in resolving cases earlier and,
thus, reducing transaction costs. At the same time, the goal of
early dispute resolution, coupled with the more favorable defini-
tion of defect under the Directive and aggressive judges seeking to
resolve litigation early, could result in increased pressure on man-
ufacturers to settle, which they would prefer not to do. Also, given
the relative dearth of general aviation products litigation in the
United Kingdom, one wonders whether litigation, which otherwise
133. Id. at pt. 35.7, 35.3.
134. CPR, supra note 128, at rule 1.4(2)(e). The CPR contemplates a wide vari-
ety of ADR mechanisms including early neutral evaluation, non-binding dispute
resolution and mediation.
135. Id. at pt. 36.20.
136. Id. at pt. 24.2.
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may not have been brought, or claims, which otherwise may not
have been made, will occur. It is difficult to imagine, for example,
that the procedure for dealing with claims pre-suit, which (as indi-
cated) requires the defendant to provide a fairly detailed list in-
cluding documents, helpful or not, would not result in more claims
than under the old system. Moreover, the Reforms place a pre-
mium on early fact-gathering by the defendant, including early ac-
cess to accident investigation reports, which often provides critical
information relative to liability, which may or may not be a prob-
lem for defendants. Finally, the distinct possibility exists under
the early disclosure provisions that injured parties will be provided
with "cheap" discovery that they otherwise would not be able to
obtain, or, if they were able to obtain it, would be at great cost.
It is difficult to predict whether the Woolf Reforms will result
in increased products litigation under the Directive. As suggested,
the reforms are fairly radical and will no doubt meet with some
resistance, particularly by the more traditional members of the bar
and judiciary in the United Kingdom. It will also be interesting to
see whether the populace will continue a perceived trend of being
more litigious. Indeed, many, particularly members of the insur-
ance industry, have predicted that the new rules will significantly
increase claims filings, as well as cause other problems. 137
Whether this will carry over into increased products lawsuits
under the Directive is an open question.
V. CONCLUSION
That strict liability in the European Union is different than its
counterpart in the United States is understandable. The Directive
emerged from a very different perspective. Strict liability in the
European Union is neither the primary mechanism for compensa-
tion for injuries arising from product harm, nor is it viewed as a
primary means of deterring unsafe products. Other factors, such
as the extensive social safety net, largely unavailable in the United
States, and sophisticated consumer protection legislation, play an
equal, if not paramount, role in the doctrine's configuration. More-
over, strict liability resulted from a legislative process which
137. See, e.g., Carolyn Aldred, Woolf's Approach, No Time to be Sheepish: U.K.
Litigation Reforms May Catch Risk Managers Unprepared, Attorneys Warn, Bus.
Insur., Feb. 22, 1999, at 17 ("Observers believe that hundreds of claims are being
stored up by plaintiff lawyers to be filed in court after the new rules take affect.").
384 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:341
sought to balance the needs of consumers against those of industry
for the overall economic well-being of the European Union. This
need for a balanced approach is still very much in evidence today.
Also, the legal systems, including damage schemes of the member
countries, are in the main very different from the system of civil
justice in the United States. There is little indication that they
will change dramatically, at least in the short run.
Nevertheless, it will not be a surprise if some change occurs.
The Commission's current study offers the potential for important
changes in favor of claimants. Also, recent amendments to the
civil justice system in the United Kingdom point to the potential
for increased activity by consumers who suffer product harm.
Moreover, there is a sense that Europeans are continuing to be-
come more aware of personal rights that could lead to an increased
resort to litigation. As the doctrine of strict liability becomes bet-
ter known, both by the public and the legal community, it should
be used more frequently. In the final analysis, however, the major
social, cultural and institutional forces which shaped the doctrine
of strict liability and control its application, remain intact and are
not likely to change in the near term. If, for example, the social
welfare programs undergo substantial reduction, strict liability
may move closer to its counterpart in the United States. At the
same time, it would be a curious development if the European
Union adopted some of the more pernicious aspects of strict liabil-
ity in the United States, at a time when some balance and sanity
has begun to be restored to product law in this county.
As previously suggested, it is difficult to predict what the Com-
mission will propose, let alone what ultimately will be adopted.
For the reasons discussed herein, dramatic change, at least in the
short run, is unlikely. This may disappoint those who view strict
liability from a purely American perspective. To do so, however,
ignores the uniqueness of the European social, cultural and insti-
tutional forces which shaped the introduction of strict liability into
the European Union. Given the diverse, yet important, objectives
which the Commission has set out to achieve since the Directive's
inception, the enactment of moderate changes to the Directive
would not be an irrational outcome.
